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Abstract
Inter domain service routing is an element in the suc-
cess of Next Generation Network. Service requests, such as
the INVITE request in Session Initiation Protocol [21] may
need to be redirected. Service Path (SPath) can be used to
hold the server paths and service information. The length of
SPath increases as the number of hops in a redirection in-
creases. The overhead for service routing which uses SPath
also increases. Thus it is desirable to optimize SPath to en-
sure efficiency and scalability of protocols involving service
routing. In this paper, we propose a re-routing strategy to
optimize service routing, and demonstrate how this strategy
can be applied to SPath to enhance the efficiency and scal-
ability of Service Network Graph (SNG). The formal proof
for SPath optimization also forms the basis of Authentica-
tion Delegation in SNG.
1. Introduction
Service redirection is one of the key elements in inter
domain service routing. Models and architectures such as
Semantic Overlay Based service Routing [7] or Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) [21, 22] requires redirection of
service requests. The service request redirection can be
accomplished with multiple redirections of only one hop
each. Service Network Graph (SNG), a remote authentica-
tion protocol, requires redirection of a service request using
single redirection via multiple hops.
SPath was proposed to hold the server path and service
information during service request redirection. As the ser-
vice network grows and redirection path gets longer, SPath
may become unmanageable. The overhead for establishing
authentication and service access will escalate. This makes
SPath not scalable. As a result we have to optimize the
SPath as the service network grows.
In this paper, we proposed a re-routing strategy to opti-
mize SPath in the context of SNG and a formal justification
using the symbols and approach presented by Lampson in
his paper [17] is presented. The formal proof for SPath opti-
mization also forms the basis of Authentication Delegation
in SNG.
This paper is organized into six sections. We will re-
view Service Network Graph in Section 2. In Section 3, we
introduce some axioms and theorems established by Lamp-
son in [17]. In Section 4 we briefly introduce the format of
SPath first and then we present our proposition. We prove
the proposition by proposing and proving four lemmas. In
Section 5, we mention how to implement the optimization
of SPath. In the Conclusion section, we summarize our
work in this paper and our work in the future.
2. Overview of Service Network Graph
Globalization of world economy means that we are no
longer confined to a geographical location. But the reality
is we are confined to use services provided by our home
network and we cannot access services offered in differ-
ent autonomous networks may due to the fact that we are
not aware of the services; or we do not know how to ac-
cess them; or we are simply not allowed to access them. It
would be desirable if one network can join another network
and share their services to their home users. Under this sce-
nario, one of the immediate problems is how to authenticate
users of the participating networks. Issues such as infor-
mation privacy, network platforms and resources make the
sharing of user authentication information of all participat-
ing networks prohibitively hard or difficult.
Towards a solution, the use of X.509 certificates [1], trust
recommendations [4, 8, 18, 20] trust establishment [6, 19,
2, 3, 5] and Kerberos [9] are developed. Nevertheless, none
of them is widely accepted as a viable solution to the prob-
lem. We first proposed Service Network Graph (SNG) in
2005 [16, 12, 11] and extended SNG to mobile users in [15].
SNG enables the linking of heterogenous networks in an ad
hoc manner to form a Service Network Graph. Within the
service network graph, home users of individual networks
can share the services provided by other networks within
SNG. To enhance the security of the authentication process,
SNG can include Dynamic Password [10] as one of its au-
thentication scheme, and thereby forming an authentication
protocol suite for heterogenous aggregation of ad hoc net-
works.
Let us briefly review the SNG and its workings. To
participate in an SNG, the authentication server AS1 of
Network1(N1), is required to share a secret key with the
authentication server AS2 of Network 2 (N2) which is part
of an SNG as shown in Figure 1. A self-authenticating
encryption channel [14] is set up between two joined net-
works. Communications between authentication servers are
protected by encryption using the shared key. Suppose N2
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Figure 1. Network 1 joins Network 2 in an
SNG
offers service Srv2. When the service Srv2 is shared with
N1, we need to indicate that this service is offered by N2.
This can be done with the Service Access Path (SAPath)
field in a Service Path (SPath). Obviously, the SAPath in
N2 is simply the address of N2 while SAPath of the same
service inN1 must include the address of Network 1 and the
address of N2. When other networks join in, we may have
an SNG as shown in Figure 2. The SAPath field of Srv2
in Network 3 (N3) should include the addresses of N2, N1
and N3.
3. Basic Axioms and Theorems
In this Section, we will present some of the Axioms and
Theorems established in [17]. The symbols used are listed
below:
Two way self−authenticated
      encryption channel
One way self−authenticated
      encryption channel
Network 1
Network 3 Network 4
Network 2
Service Network Graph
Figure 2. Graphical representation of an SNG
Symbol Meaning
s a statement
` s s is an axiom of the theory or
s is provable form the axioms.
# speak for
⇒ imply
∧ and
Axiom 1
` (PA says (PB # PA))⇒ (PB # PA)
This Axiom says that principal PA can establish a “speak
for” relationship with principal PB when he declares PB
speaks for him.
Theorem 1
` (PA # PB)⇒ ((PA says s) ⇒ (PB says s))
This theorem tells us that if principal PA speaks for princi-
pal PB , then whenever PA says something, PB would have
said the same thing.
In this paper, we are concerned with authentication au-
thority of a principal. Hence we will use a qualified “speak
for” relation. When we qualify “speak for” relationship
with the role “as Authentication Agent” (“as AA” for short),
we have a qualified version of Theorem 1 as shown in The-
orem 2 below.
Theorem 2
` (PA asAA # PB asAA) ⇒
((PA asAA says s) ⇒ (PB asAA says s))
Theorem 3
` ((PC # PA) ∧ (PC says (PB # PA)))⇒
(PB # PA)
This is called the HandOff rule by Lampson et al in [17].
In this theorem, the first condition requires (PC # PA).
Using Theorem 1, whatever PC says, PA would have said
the same. Hence the second condition of Theorem 3 can be
rewritten as (PA says (PB # PA)). Using Axiom 1, if
PA declares PB speaks for him, we can arrive at the con-
clusion (PB # PA).
4. Optimization of Service Path (SPath)
In this section we will prove that Service Paths can be
optimized and in the next section, we will show how to im-
plement the optimization of SPaths.
To illustrate our discussion, we will use a freely sharable
FTP service provided by networkNA for a cost of 215 units
as an example. The authentication server for NA has an
IP address of 10.1.1.1. The server providing the service is
called FTPSer.
4.1. Format of SPath
When network NA offers a service, the service is listed
as an SPath of the form
< SOpt : SAPath/Ser/Srv >:< C >
where
SOpt: Sharing Option
SAPath: Service Access Path
Ser: Name of Server
Srv: Name of service
C: Cost for using the service
The SAPath field in this case is simply the network ad-
dress of the authentication server (AS) of NA.
< SOpt : addNA/Ser/Srv >:< C >
So the SPath of our example FTP service listed in the ser-
vice providing network NA looks like:
< F : 10.1.1.1/FTPSer/FTP >:< 215 >
When network NB joins an SNG by attaching to network
NA, NA delegates its authentication authority to NB . NA
will also pass the SPath of the FTP service to NB . Home
users of NB can now use the FTP service offered by NA if
they are authenticated by NB . NB will list all the shared
service as SPaths by pre-pending the address of its authen-
tication server to the SAPath fields of all SPaths shared by
NA.
< SOption : addNB/addNA/Ser/Srv >:< Cost >
The SPath for FTP service in NB looks like:
< F : 10.1.2.1/10.1.1.1/FTPSer/FTP >:< 215 >
As the SAPath field will be pre-pended with a network ad-
dress every time it is shared with another network, the SAP-
ath of an SPath gets longer each time the service is shared
with another network. When users try to authenticate and
access a service, the overhead for authentication and set-
ting up a service gets larger as the SAPath gets longer. It
is imperative to keep the SAPath to an optimal length for
both efficiency and scalability. To optimize an SPath is the
transformation of the SAPath field of an arbitrary SPath to
its optimal form. In the next subsection, we will discuss the
theoretical basis of optimizing SPaths.
4.2. Optimization of SPath
We will start to prove that SPaths (SAPath field) can be
optimized with some definitions regarding Authentication
Delegation in SNG context.
Definition 1 Authentication Delegation
If network NA attaches to network NB which is a mem-
ber of an SNG, then we define NB delegates its authentica-
tion authority to network NA.
If a networkNB delegates its authentication authority to
another network NA, then we represent it as
NB asAA says (NA asAA # NB asAA)
This formalized the definition of Authentication Delegation
in an SNG. When authentication authority is delegated, we
have to keep track of the delegatee and the delegator rela-
tionships. they are recorded in Authentication Delegation
Paths. Every time when a delegation occurs, the new del-
egatee address is pre-pended to the Authentication Delega-
tion Path. So an Authentication Delegation Path would have
the address of the delegatee network as the leftmost address
and the delegator network address as the right most address.
In between are intermediate networks which were delega-
tee networks at certain time in the authentication delegation
process.
Definition 2 Authentication Delegation Path for Self-
Authentication
The Authentication Delegation Path of network NA in
network NA itself is defined as:
addNA/
It simply means NA performs authentication itself.
Definition 3 Authentication Delegation Path in Remote
Networks
If NA delegates its authentication authority to another
network NB , then we define the Authentication Delegation
Path for NA in NB to be
addNB/addNA/
within the SNG context. The delegated authentication au-
thority can further be delegated. That is to say, if NA dele-
gates authentication authority toNB which in turn delegates
the authentication authority of NA to another network NC ,
the Authentication Delegation Path looks like
addNC/(addNB/addNA/)
which is equivalent to
addNC/addNB/addNA/
Hence we can generalize our Authentication Delegation
Path definition to the following definition.
Definition 4 Authentication Delegation Path
The Authentication Delegation Path is defined as the net-
work path which traces the authentication delegation se-
quence from the delegator network to the final delegatee
network in the form of
addNdelegatee/.../addN2/addN1/addNdelegator/
With the definitions in place, we can now make the propo-
sition that SPaths can be optimized.
Proposition 1 (Optimization of SPath)
Service Path of the form
< SOpt : SAPath/Ser/Srv >:< Cost >
can always have the SAPath optimized to a two-address for-
mat
addNhome/addNservice/
and the resulting SPaths have the form
< SOpt : addNhome/addNservice/Ser/Srv >:< Cost >
We will prove this proposition by working through a se-
quence of Lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Transitivity of “speak for” relation)
` (NA asAA # NB asAA)∧ (NB asAA # NC asAA)
⇒ (NA asAA # NC asAA)
PROOF:
From the first condition in the Lemma and Theorem 2,
we have
(NA asAA says s) ⇒ (NB asAA says s)
Similarly, the second condition in the Lemma yields
(NB asAA says s) ⇒ (NC asAA says s)
So the predicate of the logic becomes:
((NA asAA says s) ⇒ (NB asAA says s))∧
((NB asAA says s) ⇒ (NC asAA says s))
Transitive property of the “⇒” relation allows us to replace
the predicate with
((NA asAA says s) ⇒ (NC asAA says s))
which is precisely what we will get when we apply Theo-
rem 2 to the conclusion of the Lemma. 
Lemma 2 (“Transitivity of Authentication Delegation in
SNG)
Suppose NA delegates the authentication authority to
NB . When NB delegates the authentication authority to
NC , the authentication authority for NA will also be dele-
gated to NC .
PROOF
When NA delegates authentication authority to NB , by
Definition 1 and Axiom 1, we have
(NB asAA # NA asAA)
When NB delegates authentication authority to NC , by
Definition 1 and Axiom 1, we have
(NC asAA # NB asAA)
These two authentication delegations satisfied the condi-
tions of Lemma 1 and so we can conclude from Lemma 1
that
(NC asAA # NA asAA) 
Lemma 3 (Authentication Delegation Path)
If NA asAA delegates its authentication authority to
another network NB asAA, then NB will have the Authen-
tication Delegation Path for NA and all Authentication
Delegation Paths NA has with the address of NB pre-
pended:
addNB/addNA/.../addN3/addN2/addN1/
PROOF
WhenN1 delegates its authentication authority toN2, by
Definition 3,N2 will have a Authentication Delegation Path
addN2/addN1/
Similarly, when N2 delegates its authentication authority to
N3, from Lemma 2, Definition 3 and Definition 4, N3 will
have two Authentication Delegation Paths
addN3/addN2/
addN3/addN2/addN1/
We keep on applying Lemma 2 and Definition 3 and 4 every
time a network delegates its authentication authority to an-
other network, until, finally NA delegates its authentication
authority to network NB . From Lemma 2, all authentica-
tion authority already delegated to NA, and the authentica-
tion authority of NA itself, will be delegated to NB . When
authentication authorities are delegated to NB all the Au-
thentication Delegation Paths will have the address of NA
pre-pended by Definition 3. 
Lemma 4 (Equivalence of Authentication Delegation)
Authentication Delegation Path of the form
addNhome/.../addN3/addN2/addN1/addNservice/
is equivalent to
addNhome/addNservice/
PROOF
Authentication Delegation Path
addNhome/.../addN3/addN2/addN1/addNservice/
indicates Nservice delegates its authentication authority to
N1 (Definition 4) which in turn delegates its authentication
authority to N2. From Lemma 2, the authentication author-
ity forNsevice will also be delegated toN2. By Definition 4
the Authentication Delegation Path of Nservice in N2 is
addN2/addN1/addNservice/
When the authentication authority for Nsevice is delegated
to N2, using Definition 1, we have
Nservice asAA says (N2 asAA # Nservice asAA)
By Axiom 1, we have
(N2 asAA # Nservice asAA)
And by Definition 3, the Authentication Delegation Path for
the delegation listed above is
addN2/addNservice/
Hence we can transform Authentication Delegation Path
from
addN2/addN1/addNservice/
to a shorter form
addN2/addNservice/
Every time we apply the argument to the address triplets
on the left hand side of an Authentication Delegation Path,
we will get one address less. By repeating the process just
described to an Authentication Delegation Path argument,
we can arrive at its optimized form:
addNhome/addNservice/ 
PROOF of Proposition 1
SAPath inside a SPath is the authentication Delegation
Path of the service to the user’s home network. Hence by
Lemma 4, all Authentication Delegation Path can be re-
duced to the form
addNhome/addNservice/
and hence we have the optimized form of an SPath. 
5. Implementing SPath Optimization
In this section, we will discuss how to achieve the SPath
optimization in an SNG context.
When network NA joins an SNG, it shares a secret key
K1 with a member network, NB of the SNG for establish-
ing a self-authenticating encryption channel. InNA the Au-
thentication Delegation Path for NB is
addNA/addNB/
When another network NC links with NA to join the
SNG, the key shared between NA and NC is K2. In NC
the Authentication Delegation Paths are
addNC/addNA/
addNC/addNA/addNB/
Proposition 1 allows us to optimize the second Authen-
tication Delegation Path to
addNC/addNB/
NC has a shared key withNA. NB has a shared key with
NA and NB has no shared key with NC . The optimized
SPath addNC/addNB/ works only when there is a shared
key between NA and NC . The shared key will be used to
establish a self-authenticating encryption channel between
NC and NB . So NC must share a key K3 with NB be-
fore optimizing any SPath in which the service is provided
by NA. As the optimized Authentication Delegation Path
indicates that NB has delegated the authentication author-
ity to NC , NB would be willing to share a common key
with NC and establish an encrypted channel. This can be
done via the original encrypted Authentication Delegation
Path or simply uses the same procedure as when NC ini-
tially links withNA. By sharing a key withNB ,NC is now
linked directly with NB . Figure 3 shows that NA shares a
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Figure 3. Sharing of key before SPath opti-
mization
key K1 with NB and the key indices for K1 are KA1 and
KB1 in NA and NB respectively. The shared between NA
and NC is K2. The key indices for K2 are KA2 and K
C
2 in
NA and NC respectively. The implementation is valid for
all SPaths which has the SAPath field optimized to the two-
address format. addNC and addNB are now replaced by
addNhome and addNserver . The home network has to initi-
ate the sharing of a key with the service providing network.
The addresses which appear in the original SAPath have no
affect on the optimization process as shown in Figure 4.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed how to optimize Service
Routing paths and a formal justification was given. With-
out optimization, SPath and hence protocols such as SNG
which require service routing may not be scalable and thus
restricting their service routing capability for the general ad
hoc aggregation of networks. With optimization, not only
the scalability of SPath, the performance for service rout-
ing will also be improved due to the shorter access path and
hence less overhead involved. The optimized SPath will
have a shorter SAPath, and this makes maintenance and net-
work trouble shooting more manageable.
Our next step is to look at the correctness of the Ser-
vice Network Graph which can provide user authentication
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Figure 4. SPath optimization in general
across heterogeneous networks of different administrative
domain without sharing user authentication information.
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